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Examining Share Lease Arrangements for Grain Operations in the
Texas Panhandle Under Changing Market Conditions
By Nicole Gueck, Steven Klose, DeDe Jones, and Jay Yates
Rental arrangements are an important component of agricultural land tenure in Texas as they are
in much of the United States.  The Texas High Plains region (NASS District 1) produces the vast
majority of Texas grain. Crop share and other lease arrangements are a typical practice in this
area. The most recent Census of Agriculture (2007) indicates that approximately 41 percent of
the 130 million acres of Texas farmland is operated by full owners (who own all of the land they
farm), 46 percent are operated by part owners (who own part of the land they farm), and 13
percent are operated by tenants (who rent all of the land they farm).  Leasing of agricultural land
is especially common in states with a high number of commercial operators, where crop receipts
make up a significant portion of farm income, and/or where land is highly valued (Moss and
Erven; Dillon, Oirade, and Parsch).
Historically, the most common type of lease arrangement between landlords and tenants in the
Texas High Plains has been a crop share agreement.  A crop share lease is characterized by the
landowner and operator both sharing in the cost of growing the crop.  In return, crop receipts
(including government payments) are shared by the landlord and tenant based on pre-
determined percentages.  The basic premise of this agreement is for each party to receive income
from the crop in the same proportion that expenses are shared. In contrast to a cash lease, a crop
share lease places the owner at higher risk for price and production volatility.  Both the owner
and operator share the risk of yields and/or prices being lower than expected. On the other hand
by sharing crop receipts and expenses, the farm operator is giving up a higher profit potential
during good years (Pflueger).
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Abstract
This paper examines the preferred
share arrangement for both
landlords and tenants producing
grain in the Texas High Plains
(based on risk preference), and
determines the sensitivity to
changing input costs and market
prices.  Results of the analyses show
that tenants and landlords prefer
different arrangements in all
scenarios.  Results also indicate that
a tenant would prefer a different
lease arrangement in 2008 than in
2005, while the landlord’s preference
would remain unchanged.
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They can vary greatly throughout the country and even within a single
region.  In most cases, landowners and tenants try to negotiate an
arrangement that is fair and equitable to both parties.  According to
Langemeier, a good share lease should follow five basic principles: (1)
yield increasing inputs should be shared; (2) share arrangements
should be adjusted as technology changes; (3) total returns should be
divided in the same proportion as resources contributed; (4) long-
term investments should be compensated when the lease is
terminated; and (5) there must be good communication between
landowner and tenant.  Examples of yield increasing inputs are
fertilizer, chemicals, irrigation and possibly hybrid seed.
Crop share agreements for grain in the Texas High Plains typically
involve a 33 percent crop share.  However, individual costs shared by
the landlord and tenant differ between the Northern and Southern
High Plains.  In the Northern High Plains, the landlord typically pays
33 percent of fertilizer, chemicals, and irrigation costs.  In the
Southern High Plains, the landlord typically pays 33 percent of
fertilizer, insecticide and harvest costs.  According to regional Texas
AgriLife Extension Economists, sharing irrigation expenses in the
Northern High Plains has only become standard within the last five
years.  There is also a question of whether landlords should be sharing
in seed cost, due to the prevalence of seed-enhancing technologies
that result in increased yields.  In some areas of the Texas High Plains,
producers have switched to a straight share lease, where the landlord
shares no costs and receives 20 percent of crop income.  While this
option does not follow the logic of sharing both costs and revenues, it
is an option that does not require investment, other than land, by the
landlord.
This paper determines the preferred share arrangement individually
for both landlords and tenants producing grain in the Texas High
Plains (based on risk preference).  It also examines how this preferred
lease is affected by input costs and market prices.  The analysis
calculates Net Returns above Variable Costs for both the tenant and
landlord in five alternative share arrangements currently being used or
considered in the region.  Results are determined at the whole farm
level, assuming a crop mix of irrigated (pivot) corn, irrigated (pivot)
wheat, dryland wheat, and dryland sorghum under two scenarios.
The first scenario assumes 75 percent of the acres are irrigated and 25
percent are dryland, while the second scenario assumes that 75
percent of the acres are dryland and 25 percent are irrigated.  The
analysis provides a side-by-side comparison of each scenario in two
significantly different market environments: 2005 (lower cost and low
price) and 2008 (record high costs and prices).
Literature
Numerous studies have focused on the advantages and disadvantages
of alternative farmland leases and the balance of benefits to the
landlord and tenant (Langemeier, Albright, and DeLano; Davis;
Issawi; Adam and Rask; Chueng).  However, as noted by Rainey, et
al., except for Bierlen, et al., the literature primarily focuses on the
selection of contract type without considering alternative terms
within contract types.  For example, Muzinga, Lins, and Boehlje
analyzed the returns to landowners and tenants for cash, share, and
flexible leases. Held; Patterson, Hanson, and Robison; and Burton, et
al. concluded that in general, most landlords will choose a cash lease,
while tenants will typically choose a share lease arrangement.
A significant amount of research has also been completed on the
importance of considering the risk tolerance of the decision maker
with regard to contract preference (Sutinen; Hiebert; Robison and
Barry; Rainey, et al.).  In a 2004 South Carolina grain study, Davis
ranked preferred leasing alternatives by risk preference for both the
landlord and tenant using certainty equivalents.  H owever , to our
knowledge, no previous literature has ranked alternative share lease
arrangements (based on contract terms) using the stochastic efficiency
with respect to a function (SERF) method of stochastic dominance
analysis.  This method, fully described in Hardaker and Lien
partitions a set of risky alternatives in terms of certainty equivalents
for a specified range of attitudes to risk. We are also not aware of
previous literature that has examined preferences for share lease
contract terms under varying market conditions.
Data and Methods
The base analysis in this study is performed using Texas AgriLife
Extension Services’ Financial And Risk Management Assistance
(FARM Assistance).  As described by Klose and Outlaw, the FARM
Assistance program is technically a 10-year pro forma stochastic
financial analysis model.
Best described as a computerized decision support model, Financial
and Risk Management (FARM) Assistance is a highly specialized
Extension effort aimed at helping farmers and ranchers with strategic
planning and risk management.  The program uses both farm-level
i n for m a t ion s u pplied b y part icipa t i n g pr oduce rs as w ell as m ar k et
price forecasts from the Food and Agricultural Policy Research
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Assistance program conducts financial analyses for over 150
individuals each year, and the individual client work creates a rich
database of information describing real Texas farms and ranches.
The FARM Assistance database was queried to extract yields, prices
received, and input costs for all crop producing units of irrigated
(pivot) corn, irrigated wheat, dryland wheat, and dryland sorghum
reported by participants in Texas AgriLife Extension Districts 1 and 2
for 2005 and 2008 (as reported in Table 1).  Extension District 1
includes the 22 most northern counties in the Texas Panhandle, and
District 2 includes the 20 counties south of District 1 (see Figure 1).
The data from District 1 and District 2 were aggregated, and
weighted averages by planted acres were used for yields, prices, and
input costs.  No overhead costs were included in this study.
Five alternative lease arrangement scenarios were developed based on
typical crop share arrangements for grain production in the region as
well as new variations being considered.  Alternative 1 represents a
typical District 1 arrangement: 33 percent crop share with landlord
sharing fertilizer, herbicide, insecticide, and irrigation costs.
Alternative 2 represents a typical arrangement in District 2: 33
percent crop share with landlord sharing fertilizer, insecticide, and
harvest costs.  Alternative 3 represents a slight variation on the
expense sharing that may be considered: 33 percent crop share with
landlord sharing seed, fertilizer, herbicide, and insecticide costs, but
not irrigation.  Seed-enhancing technologies that result in increased
yields have become standard in this area, and the historical concept of
expense sharing was that the landlord shared in the yield-increasing
expenses.  Alternative 4 assumes that landlord agrees to share in the
cost of all items considered “yield improving,” including seed,
fertilizer, herbicide, insecticide, and irrigation.  Alternative 5
demonstrates what some are calling a straight share arrangement that
is becoming more popular in the Texas High Plains region.  In this
arrangement, the landlord shares none of the crop production costs
and receives 20 percent of crop income.  None of these alternatives are
being proposed here as optimal, but rather they are the variations
currently being used or considered in the region.  An overview of the
five alternative scenarios is provided in Table 2.
Two scenarios were analyzed assuming one section (640 acres) of
farmland.  The first, or irrigated scenario assumed the section was
primarily (75%) irrigated.  The second, or dryland scenario, assumed
the section was primarily (75%) dryland.  The crops and acres used to
run the whole farm scenario analyses are provided in Table 3.  Both
irrigated and dryland scenarios were run in two different market
environments, 2005 and 2008.  According to FARM Assistance data,
input costs for grain in the Texas Panhandle were expected to be 40
to50 percent higher in 2008 than they were in 2005.  Market prices
during the peak of the season were up 100 percent or more, depending
on the crop, in 2008 versus 2005.  For purposes of this study, arbitrary
prices representing the lower to mid-range of the futures market
between January and August 2008 were used.  Corn price was
assumed to be $5.00, wheat price was assumed to be $9.00, and
sorghum was assumed to be $4.45.
The results of each simulation were then ranked using stochastic
efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) and defined in terms of
Pratt Risk Aversion Coefficients (RACs). The Pratt risk aversion
coefficient is a measure of a hypothetical person’s aversion to risk.  A
method of stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF),
SERF orders a set of risky alternatives in terms of certainty equivalents
(CEs) for a specified range of attitudes to risk. Unlike conventional
SDRF, SERF involves comparing each alternative with all the other
alternatives simultaneously, not pairwise, and hence can produce a
smaller efficient set than that found by simple pairwise SDRF over the
same range of risk attitudes. (Hardaker and Lien)  Absolute risk
aversion coefficients ARAC were based on Anderson and Dillon’s
(1992) classification of degree of risk aversion, which is based on the
magnitude of the relative risk aversion coefficient.  Measured in very
small increments, the lower absolute risk aversion coefficient (ARAC)
was set at 0 representing a risk neutral tenant or landlord and the
upper ARAC was set at 0.0001 representing an extremely risk averse
tenant or landlord.  As discussed by Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker,
risk-averse behavior is common and aversion to risk is expected to
decrease as wealth increase.  The midpoint of these two ARACs is
considered to be “somewhat risk averse”.  The scenario with the
highest CE within a range of ARACs is the preferred scenario.  CE is
based on the negative exponential utility function with constant risk
aversion.  The decision maker is indifferent between scenarios at the
point where CE lines cross; this is also known as the “breakeven risk
aversion coefficient” or BRAC (McCarl).
Results
As shown in Table 4 and Figure 2, in the 2005 irrigated scenario,
tenants preferred the crop share arrangement represented by
Alternative 4 above all others regardless of risk aversion.  The second
most preferred option was Alternative 1, followed by Alternative 5,
2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
168Alternative 3 and Alternative 2; this ranking remained constant across
all RACs.  The risk premium (RP) between Alternative 4 and
Alternative 1 is $3,988.81 at all RACs.  This is the amount of money
that a tenant would require in order to be indifferent between
Alternatives 1 and 4.
The landlord’s preferred share arrangement under the 2005 irrigated
scenario is Alternative 2 at all RACS; the second most preferred
option is Alternative 3 with the risk premium between Alternative 2
and 3 increasing with risk aversion from $4,328 to $4,380 (refer to
Table 4 and Figure 3).  As may be expected, the preferred alternatives
of the landlord and tenant are not the same, and in most cases,
completely opposite, which should necessitate some kind of
compromise in order to ensure that the lease arrangement is fair and
equitable to both parties.
Interestingly, the 2005 dryland scenario results in the tenant choosing
Alternative 5 over all others, if he/she is risk neutral, but reverting
back to Alternative 4 with higher levels of risk aversion.  Alternative 4
is the second most preferred option for a risk neutral tenant, while
Alternative 5 is the second most preferred for a slightly risk averse and
Alternative 1 is second for an extremely risk averse tenant (Table 5 and
Figure 4).
As shown in Table 5 and Figure 5, the landlord in the 2005 dryland
scenario prefers Alternative 3 if he/she is risk neutral or slightly risk
averse, but Alternative 2 if extremely risk averse.  In both the risk
neutral and somewhat risk averse scenarios, the second most preferred
option is Alternative 3, but the risk premium decreases substantially
between Alternative 3 and Alternative 2 as risk aversion increases.
In the 2008 irrigated scenario, tenants preferred the straight share
lease represented by Alternative 5 if risk neutral and continue to
choose Alternative 4 if more risk averse.  The second most preferred
option was Alternative 4 for the risk neutral tenant, Alternative 5 for
the somewhat risk averse tenant and Alternative 1 for the extremely
risk averse tenant.  The ranking order for risk neutral and somewhat
risk averse tenants is different in 2008 than it was in 2005 reflecting
the value of changing from 33 to 20 percent payment to the landlord
at higher commodity prices.  The order preference for an extremely
risk averse tenant is unchanged in the new market environment.
However, the risk premium between Alternative 1 and Alternative 4
in 2008 is 50 percent higher than it was in 2005, indicating that the
tenant would require significantly more money to be indifferent
between Alternative 4 and Alternative 1 at a higher market price
environment (Table 6 and Figure 6).
The landlord’s preferred share arrangement under the 2008 irrigated
scenario is Alternative 2 across all RACs, which is unchanged from
2005.  The risk premium between Alternative 2 and Alternative 3
however is 84% higher in 2008 than it was in 2005 reflecting the
escalated costs of seed and herbicide costs not shared in alternative 2
(see Table 6 and Figure 7).
As reported in Table 7 and Figure 8, the 2008 dryland scenario for
tenants results in the same ranking as 2005 for the risk neutral or
somewhat risk averse.  Alternative 5 is preferred to Alternative 4 for
the risk neutral tenant and Alternative 4 is preferred to Alternative 5
for the somewhat risk averse tenant.  The extremely risk averse tenant
also chooses Alternative 4, with Alternative 1 being preferred second.
For this same scenario in 2005, Alternative 1 was preferred second.  
The landlord in the dryland scenario chooses Alternative 2 over
Alternative 3 at all RACs.  This ranking is different than in 2005
when the landlord preferred Alternative 3 unless he/she was extremely
risk averse (see Table 7 and Figure 9).
The certainty equivalent per acre for a ‘somewhat risk averse’ landlord
was also calculated for each alternative and is provided in Table 8.
According to Texas AgriLife Extension planning budgets for the
region, a typical cash lease rate for an irrigated farm with the crop mix
used this analysis was estimated to be $65 in 2008; the cash lease rate
for a similar dryland farm was $35.  The comparable CE per acre
calculated in this analysis for 2008 are significantly higher than those
estimated by Extension budgets because of the high arbitrary prices
used to calculate Net Returns above Variable Costs.  Due to the short
time frame during which prices remained at those levels, it is not
believed that landlords and tenants had time to react to and/or re-
negotiate cash lease contracts.  Based on the analysis however, if prices
bounce back to such levels in the future and remain there for any
length of time, such conditions would put upward pressure on cash
lease rates. 
Conclusions
This paper examines the preferred share arrangement for both
landlords and tenants producing grain in the Texas High Plains
(based on risk preference), and determines whether the results are
affected by input costs and market prices.  Based on the results of the
analysis, the following conclusions can be made:
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tenant also the most preferred by the landlord or vice versa,
suggesting that compromise arrangements are more likely to be
found in the middle ranked preferences of both tenants and
landlords;
• Crop share lease arrangements should be determined with
consideration to the risk aversion characteristics of both the
tenant and the landlord;
• New market conditions (e.g., increased costs and prices) call for a
review of existing lease agreements as indicated by the difference
in preferred alternatives in 2005 versus 2008, especially for
tenants;
• The typical share arrangement practiced in District 2 is the most
preferred alternative for landlords in most of the scenarios
studied, and the least preferred for tenants.  Not surprisingly, it is
in this region where the most discussion of changing lease terms
has occurred recently; and
• Tenant preference for the new ‘straight share lease’ scenario being
utilized in District 2 depends heavily on market conditions and
risk aversion.  It is important to remember that what seems like a
favorable lease arrangement could change as markets change.
Finally, while negotiating share lease arrangements, it should be noted
that the agreement to lease land is market driven.  While some may
have a concept of what is fair and equitable, the terms of share lease
agreements are developed through a market bidding process.
However, in order to be an informed participant in the market for
land leases, one must consider the impact and value of varying lease
terms.
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Figure 1.  Map of District 1 and District 22010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Figure 2.  SERF under a negative exponential utility function, tenant, irrigated (2005)
Figure 3.  SERF under a negative exponential utility function, landlord, irrigated (2005)2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Figure 4.  SERF under a negative exponential utility function, tenant, dryland (2005)
Figure 5.  SERF under a negative exponential utility function, landlord, dryland (2005)2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Figure 6.  SERF under a negative exponential utility function, tenant, irrigated (2008)
Figure 7.  SERF under a negative exponential utility function, landlord, irrigated (2008)2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Figure 8.  SERF under a negative exponential utility function, tenant, dryland (2008)
Figure 9.  SERF under a negative exponential utility function, landlord, dryland (2008)2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Table 1.  Weighted average cost of production and revenue factors for Texas North Plains, 2005 vs. 2008
Table 2.  Alternative share arrangement scenarios
Table 3.  Crops and acres used for whole farm analysis2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Table 4.  Tenant versus landlord results ranked using SERF, irrigated (2005)
Table 5.  Tenant versus landlord results ranked using SERF, dryland (2005)
Table 6.  Tenant versus landlord results ranked using SERF, irrigated (2008)2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Table 7.  Tenant versus landlord results ranked using SERF, dryland (2008)
Table 8.  Certainty equivalent per acre for each alternative, 2005 and 2008